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Abbreviations and acronyms 
AHT   Anchor Handler Tug 
AHTS   Anchor Handler Tug Supply 
b/d  Barrels per day 
Bcf  Billion Cubic Feet 
BOE  Barrels of Oil Equivalent 
CAPEX  Capital Expenditure 
DP  Dynamic Positioning 
EIA  Energy Information Administration  
E&P  Exploration and Production 
EPC  Engineering, Procurement, Construction 
EPIC  Engineering, Procurement, Installation, Commission 
FDP  Field Development Plan 
FEED  Front End Engineering Design 
FID  Final Investment Decision 
FLNG  Floating Liquefied Natural Gas  
FPSO  Floating Production, Storage and Off loading 
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FPU  Floating Production Unit 
FSO  Floating Storage and Off loading  
FSRU  Floating Storage and Regas Unit 
FSU  Floating Storage Unit 
GoM  Gulf of Mexico 
IEA  International Energy Agency 
IOC  International Oil Company 
mmcf/d Million Cubic Feet per Day 
MOC  Major Oil Company 
MOPU  Mobile Offshore Production Unit 
Mtpa   Million Tons Per Annum 
MOU   Mobile Offshore Unit 
NCS   Norwegian Continental shelf 
NE   North Europe  
NOC   National Oil Company 
O&G   Oil and Gas 
OPEC  Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
OPEX  Operational Expenditure 
OSV  Offshore Support Vessel 
2P   Proved and Probable Reserves 
3P   Proved, Probable and Possible Reserves 
PSV  Platform Supply Vessel  
SEA  Southeast Asia 
Semi   Production Semisubmersible 
SAmer  South America 
SPAR   Production Spar 
SURF  Subsea, Umbilical, Riser and Flowline 
SWA/ME Southwest Asia / Middle East  
Tcf  Trillion Cubic Feet 






This extended summary has been developed as a supportive document to the article “A look 
at the oil & gas market from 2013 to 2020 - an analysis of the disruptive effects on the O&G 
value chain”. The article follows directly after this summary.  
 
The background is the global decline of the O&G industry following a significant drop in oil 
prices which started in 2014. I have set out to analyse appurtenant events considering 
Michael Porter`s theory of the Five Competing Forces. Besides shedding light on the events 
and changes in the upstream O&G sector, my aim has been to test the applicability of 
Porter`s theories for said events.  
 
I decided to set up my research as a case study. This seemed to be the type of research 
approach which lends itself best to the explorative and descriptive nature of this assignment. 
I initially wanted to conduct this as a single case study. However, with the current disruption 
in the oil and gas market, caused by both the Corona virus and politically motivated actors, I 
have continued to examine the ongoing downfall in oil prices throughout Q1 in 2021. 
 
I have found that the upstream sectors are very much interdependent and receptive to 
changes across and between each other. The fall in oil prices has led to much reduced 
activity and a lot of change management in the industry. Porter`s forces are relevant and 
applicable as a tool for analysing these types of events.   
 
The events can be described and understood by applying the Five Forces model.  
Hence, it is my belief that this research article has proven both the applicability of the 
assessment method and the value introduced by the model in making strategic decisions 









This assignment will describe the downfall in global oil price of 2014-2016 and the onward 
effect it had on the sectors in the Upstream value chain all the way to 2021. I have looked at 
this through the lens of Michael Porter`s theory of the Five Competing Forces. Beside academic 
theory, I have applied known market intel, economic figures and reports, and my own 
experience as a member of this industry, as a foundation for the assignment.  
 
There is some overlap between the article and the extended summary. I have deliberately 
kept these pieces of information in the summary, despite being included in the article. The 
reason is to provide a complete link between research method, data collection, and analysis 
of empiric data by offering a more elaborate description in the summary.  
 
Should this article be published, would ELSEVIER Energy be a suitable publication. 
  
Between 2014 and 2016 the oil and gas industry experienced a massive change following a 
significant drop in oil price. Since the recovery from the global recession in 2008 the oil price 
had climbed steadily towards USD 120 in 2014 before a collapse in the market drove it down to 
USD 35 in 2016. This had a significant effect on all sectors of the industry through the whole 
value chain from seismic, via exploration to production. It also affected engineering designers, 
yards, and operators.  
 
Much has changed in the whole O&G industry, and in the upstream sector specifically. An 
increasing focus on cost cuts and financial discipline has led to reduced margins and 
profitability. Tens of thousands of oil and gas workers were laid off. Despite a rise in the activity 
level, only a fraction has returned to the industry, and service providers have been forced to 
operate with reduced staffing. The oil majors are making the rest of the supply chain continue 
to deliver services under strained conditions. This has kept the pressure on vendors which have 
seen reduced margins and revenue.   
 
An upturn which started gradually by the end of 2017 grew slowly during 2018 to represent 
cautious optimism by the end of 2019. Unfortunately, the impact of Covid-19 hit the industry 




The main aim for this assignment is to assess the change in the upstream sectors of the O&G 
industry and analyse these changes against Michael Porter`s theory of the Five Competitive 
Forces that shapes strategy. I have defined the upstream value chain as to include seismic, 
exploration, production, and support sectors for the purpose of this exercise. I will review 
each sector against all of Porter`s forces and also look at events in light of the additional 
factors highlighted in Porter`s theory.  
 
The hypothesis is that Michael Porter`s theory is applicable also for the upstream O&G 
industry and the event that took place between 2013 and 2021. My analysis will test this 
hypothesis by analysing historic data to see if it is true.  
 
 
Theory & Research Design 
Data collection  
Robert Yin (2018) mentions six sources of case study evidence:  
Documentation   Archival Records   Interviews   




I will be careful not to pull in too much data. Organizing data in a way that I will be able to 
absorb and analyse it properly will be key. I need to consider what kind of data I will need, from 




Norman Blaikie (2000) describes three types of data: primary, secondary, and tertiary. Primary 
data has been generated by the researcher (me). This makes me well positioned to evaluate the 
quality of the data as well as the production and analysis of same data. Secondary data has 
been generated by someone else. It is likely that the purpose of collecting this data is different 
from mine. Since I am further removed from the data it is difficult to evaluate the quality with 
the same assertiveness. It is common to archive secondary data sets to allow other researchers 
to analyse them. Tertiary data remove the end user even further from the original data. Often 
only the results are available, not the raw data as such.  
 
Strategy analysis theory 
I have used Michael Porter`s theory on the Five Competitive Forces that Shape Strategy to 
assess the events across the O&G upstream value chain since 2013. I have analysed the 
sectors separately and also looked for ties between the sectors. I have found that the sectors 
in the value chain are interdependent. Particularly the OSV sector is affected by events that 
spill out in any or all the other sectors. All are mostly affected by the E&P companies 
spending strategies.  
 
Porter's five forces are: Competitive rivalry, Potential of new entrants into the industry, 
Power of suppliers, Power of customers, Threat of substitute product.  
 
Competitive rivalry (1) 
Competitive rivalry is a significant force. Understanding the competition and being able to 
counter competitive initiatives is key to be able to differentiate own products in a 
demanding market. This includes being aware of competing products, technology 
developments and strategic moves by the competition.  Being aware of going rates in your 
market is also important so you can develop your own pricing strategy which meets the 
customers expectation.  
 
In the O&G upstream industry this means pushing forward technology development 
together with the client. Offering digital and remote services to reduce invasive activities 
which disturb operation, thus supporting uptime and protecting OPEX.  
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It is also important to demonstrate technical know-how by subject matter experts and to 
capitalise on existing market share to win over customers from competition through both 
advertising and real-time support.  
 
Potential of new entrants into the industry (2) 
New entrants introduce a shift in the existing market balance. This affect pricing strategies, 
cost estimates and the rate of growth needed to maintain an existing market share. Barrier 
to enter or exit a market influences the threat of entries. If the barrier to enter is low, you 
can expect a continuous stream of new competitors. If the barriers are high, the competition 
pool will largely remain the same.  
 
The most attractive market is that with high barriers to enter and low barriers to exit. 
However, as seen in the O&G upstream sectors, if the barrier to enter is high, investments 
are typically so high that it always makes leaving more painful. Other factors which influence 
barriers to enter - beside financial demands, are the ability to go large to spread cost across 
a bigger volume and customer willingness created by angular momentum stimulated 
networks (group thinking/behaviour).  
 
Power of suppliers (3) 
The power of suppliers refers to the possibility to influence buyers and market terms and 
conditions based on the suppliers’ unique position. This can influence price, quantity, and 
quality. As seen in the O&G industry since 2013, a significant oversupply of service providers,  
a steep fall in commodity prices, combined with deep cuts in E&P spending have left 
upstream stakeholders with very little bargaining power.  
 
Power of customers (4) 
The power of customers (buyers) follows the same mechanisms as described above. 
Customer’s power is high when they have many options and low when there are fewer 
alternatives. This leverage over suppliers provides an opportunity to dictate terms and 





Threat of substitute product (5) 
A substitution is another way of solving the same existing need. If the cost of changing if low, 
and the perceived differentiation is seen to adds value - this will be appealing to customers 
and the threat of substation is high. If the solution is less than ready, not directly available or 
if the cost of shifting solution is high, then the threat of substitution if low. These effects 
have been seen in the upstream value chain, exemplified by MOUs performing rig moves 




I have decided to use a Case Study approach. I have found that the applicability of this format is 
best suited to analyse and describe cause and effect within the context that it occurred.  It also 
suits to determine factors which influenced decisions and actions throughout the crisis.  
 
A Case Study uses a mixture of methods: observations, informants, interviewing, tracing, and 
studying of relevant documents. As a result, the case study cannot be categorized as a specific 
technique. It is rather a way of organizing social data (Blaikie 2000).  
 
Three of the most common purposes of research are exploration, description, and explanation. 
Many seems to believe that the case study can only be used successfully for exploratory 
studies, but several famous studies have confirmed the applicability of the case study both for 
explanatory cases (Allison and Zelikow’s Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 
1999) and descriptive studies (Street Corner Society (1943/1993), by William F. Whyte). 
 
A descriptive case study has narrowed down a phenomenon and endeavours to assess it in 
detail. This is completed against a descriptive theory. The explanatory case study focuses on 
an explanation for a question or a phenomenon. The results from this kind of study are clear 
and not debatable. An exploratory case study often leads up to a formal, large-scale research 




This study is both exploratory and descriptive in nature. In my assignment, I have used the 
COSMOS Corporation guide, as described by Robert Yin (page 39, Case Study Research and 
Applications, 2018) to help determine research method suitability.   
 
Robert Yin (2018) uses a twofold definition to explain what a case study is. The definition 
describes how a case study research cover a mode of inquiry, including design, data collection 
techniques, and data analysis.   
 
He explains how a case study is an empirical method that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon (the “case”) in depth and within its real-world context, especially when the 
boundaries between phenomenon and context may not be clear. It is copes with the technically 
distinctive situation in which there will be many more variables of interest than data points, 
and as one result benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide 
design, data collection, and analysis, and as another result relies on multiple sources of 
evidence, with data needing to converge in a triangulating fashion. 
 
Robert Yin`s definition of a case study fits particularly well as a description of my intentions “to 
conduct an empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life 
context; when boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly defined and 
multiple sources are used.”. 
 
My Case 
I initially wanted to conduct this as a single case study. However, with the current disruption in 
the oil and gas market, caused by both the Corona virus and politically motivated actors, it is 
only natural to reference the ongoing downfall in oil prices throughout Q1 in 2020. I will try to 
briefly explain any common cases, and effects on stakeholders and markets between 2014-
2016 and 2020. Dealing with multiple cases, even though it can be argued that they are 
interlinked, I will be vigilant to ensure replication to enable valid comparison between 2014-






Research Design Quality 
To establish the research design quality, we typically apply four recognized academic tests. 
These four tests are applicable throughout the entire research project and has impact on the 
quality of data, what kind of date is being used, and how data is being gathered and 
processed.  Most of the testing should actually occur during the early phases of data 
collection, data analysis, or the study design phase of the research. They are: 
• Construct validity 
• Internal validity  
• External validity, and 
• Reliability 
 
Validity refers to relevancy of both applied tools as well as the measured items in the data 
collection. In short, if we are measuring the thing we set out to measure. Reliability refers to 
consistency of research data and results. High reliability means that the researcher can verify 
findings and results by conducting the exact same process over again. 
 
Construct Validity  
To meet the test of construct validity it is important to develop a practical set of relevant 
measures and to avoid subjective judgment because of preconceived notions. Measures, like 
reports and statistics must be up to date and contain current information. Findings must be 
defined in terms which relates to study objectives. Multiple sources should be applied. Key 
stakeholders may review the draft report to ensure validity.  
 
Internal Validity  
Internal validity may be threatened because of spurious effects. If the researcher 
erroneously concludes that there is a link between two factors, without knowing there is a 
third factor influencing the relationship, the research design has problems with internal 
validity.  
 
This is mainly applicable for explanatory case studies, where the researched is trying to 
explain why one thing led to another.  
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This logic is not applicable to descriptive or exploratory research designs. Also, if the 
researched is assuming something based on a previous occurrence which cannot be directly 
observed, internal validity may suffer. Robert Yin (2018) suggests the following 
compensating measures: pattern matching, explanation building, addressing rival 
explanations, and using logic models. 
 
External Validity 
The third test helps determine if the study`s findings can be generalized. The way the 
research questions are formed can contribute to, or hamper, generalization. The application 
of “how” and “why” questions can be helpful. The foundation for external validity should be 
established during the study design phase to ensure applicable theories are included to 
support the external validity of any case study.  
 
Reliability  
The fourth test should demonstrate that the activities of a study can be repeated, with the 
same results. This means in fact studying the same case over again, not just applying the 
results for another case. The aim is to reduce residual errors and biases by being able to 
document which procedures you have followed throughout the case study. Without any 
reliability, a researcher would not even be able to replicate his own work. Robert Yin (2018) 
suggest the use of a case study protocol to deal with the documentation and the 
development of a case study database.  
 
Pitfalls 
Beside quality data input with good reliability and validity, and a relevant outcome which adds 
value, there are several key items to look after in order to ensure a successful research process.  
 
The ability to get relevant respondents is crucial. It is also important that the communication is 
relaxed and takes place in a comfortable, secure space. A comfortable setting helps create open 
and honest communication that will provide relevant and valuable data. Information must be 
relevant and current. Both respondents, market intel, newspaper articles and other sources of 




Discussion & Conclusion 
The analysis along with the investigation and writing processes have certainly contributed to 
new knowledge for myself. Mainly by providing new in-depth knowledge about the industry 
in which I work, but also knowledge about the Five Forces theory and its applicability in 
strategic assessment for the upstream O&G industry. Hopefully, this summary and the main 
article will contribute with the same to other readers, both colleagues from this industry and 
those with limited exposure to oil and gas.  
 
The seismic sector is at the very beginning of the upstream value chain and this sector was 
hit first by cuts in E&P spending. With expensive vessels, barriers are high both to enter and 
exit the market. Some technology development has improved service deliveries, like 4D data 
and permanently placed acoustic transponders on the seabed. Strategic decisions to let 
vessels operate below capabilities (older 3D vessels doing 2D work) in attempts to 
differentiate fleets and companies have not been successful. A decline in contract work has 
led to multi-client work where the seismic company do surveys on their own expense and 
market data to more than one client.  
 
The exploration segment experienced very favorable new build terms between 2008 and 
2014 which led to a lot of new contracts since barriers to entry was relatively low. The fleet 
was old at the time and the recycle process was much needed. With the sudden drop in oil 
prices and a halt in exploration work, the mobile offshore unit sector was quickly 
oversupplied. Competitive rivalry was intense. Units were laid up and several owners 
delayed or even walked away from undelivered drilling rigs. As time progressed most drilling 
contractors used this idle period to reconsolidate their fleets. Scraping of units, company 
mergers and debt negotiations were common occurrences in the exploration sector.  
The segment saw little new entries but neither many exits. This can be explained by Porter`s 
theory about barriers as new rigs at the time cost between 300-500 mill. US dollar, and was 
quite a commitment, even for mature companies.  
 
Production vessels ranged between new builds and converted oil tankers. Both options are 
very costly and require a firm long-term contract to be executed. Following the seismic and 
exploration segments, production was also hit in 2014.  
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Competitive rivalry led to cost cuts and lower fees. Several projects went ahead because of 
investment decisions already made. The production sector was the upstream sector least hit 
by the downfall between 2013 and 2021.  
 
We have seen the threat of substitution play out as FPSOs are increasingly competing 
against tie-back and pipeline design solutions as infrastructure continue to improve in 
mature fields. Currently we see a focus on sustainability and green profiling as ways to 
differentiate themselves among cost conscious clients and competitors. However, the 
ultimate driver in successful contract negotiations is still cost. 
 
The support sector includes a myriad of companies, with the average owner holding less 
than 4 vessels in her fleet. The top three companies only own 13% of the total fleet. Barriers 
to entry has traditionally been low, and as a result the sector is widely oversupplied. The 
vessel owner is left with little bargaining power and suppressed rates and massive lay-up is 
the result of buyer dominance, particularly since the impact of Covid-19 wiped out the 
positive effects of a brief and much-needed market recovery in 2018/2019.  Given the small 
average fleet, scrapping has relatively large impact on fleets and owners have been reluctant 
to decommission necessary parts of the global fleet. Hence, vessels have operated below 
capabilities on rates very close to OPEX.  
 
The analysis of the sectors in light of Porter`s theory has demonstrated its applicability for 
the complex, interdependent upstream value chain. The five forces describe activities and 
events which has played out across the sectors in the upstream industry with great accuracy.  
This is backed up by market intelligence and historic statistics from the oil and gas industry. 
Consequently, this research article has contributed to confirm how can be used to tackle 
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The global oil industry is currently suffering low oil prices and a significantly reduced activity 
level, compared to the past 8-10 years. The reduced activity has had a spillover effect on the 
whole industry and both upstream and downstream sectors are affected. Upstream are 
typically defined as exploration and production, and downstream are seen as transportation, 
refining and distribution to consumer.  
 
The collapse in oil prices between 2014 and 2016 was driven by a major oversupply and a 
lack of expected global growth. The oil price drop was a staggering 70 percent during the 
period (Global Economic Prospects, Jan. 2018).  
Abstract 
 
This assignment will describe the downfall in global oil price between 2014-2016 and the 
spillover effect it has had on the entire oil and gas industry up till 2021.  I will further debate 
the following change which took place throughout the industry. This change involved all 
parts of the upstream value chain including company operations, employees, investors, and 
end users. I will analyze the events in light of Michael Porter`s model of Five Competitive 
Forces 
 
The question I will try to answer in this assignment is: how the oil & gas industry managed the 
crisis that followed the slump in global oil price of 2014-2016 onwards to 2021, and how 
applicable is Porter`s model when it comes to understanding the mechanisms in the oil and gas 
market sectors.  
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One other factor contributing the slump in oil prices where increased shale oil production in 
the U.S. Shale oil is produced by fragmenting the shale to extract the oil in the shale. This is 
mostly accomplished by above ground mining processes. The U.S production output grew by 
over 16% in 2014, which was the highest growth rate since 1940 (U.S. Energy Information 
Administration, 30th of March 2015).  
 
Geopolitical concerns, and Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 
policies also contributed to reduce the oil prices considerably during the same period. OPEC 
is an intergovernmental organisation of 13 countries, accounting for approximately 44 
percent of the global oil production. OPEC members sit on an estimated 81 percent of the 
remaining oil reserves of the world. Consequently, they have a lot of influence on the global 
oil price.  
 
The disruption on the oil industry led to major changes in all levels of the industry. My 
objectives in this study are to: 
• Describe the changes in the Upstream sector of the global oil industry. 
• Analyse compiled data against Michael Porter`s theory of the Five Competitive Forces 
to determine its applicability in the Upstream sector. 
 
I have gathered data from a variety of industry sources, including ClarksonPlatou Offshore 
Outlook, The International Monetary Fund Working Papers, Upstream Magazine archive, 
American Bureau of Shipping Offshore Outlook, and Energy Maritime Associates, Floating 
Production Systems Reports. I have collected information from 2013 up till 2021, and cross-
checked output from various sources to confirm data accuracy.  
 
I have analysed the industry sector by sector looking at new-build volumes, acquisitions, 
mergers, and contracts. I have then discussed these findings across all sectors to establish an 
overarching picture of industry events overall and the way these events have been managed 
by stakeholders and decision makers in the industry. Finally, I have looked at the aggregated 





By analysing this information through the lens of Michael Porters theory of competitive forces I 
will be able to contribute to research by shedding light on subsequent processes across the 
Upstream value chain from 2014 to 2021 occurring because of said market downfall.  This 
knowledge can help shape strategies and support decision making for in the future. 
 
Backdrop 
Between 2014 and 2016 the oil and gas industry experienced a massive disruption following a 
significant drop in oil price. Since the recovery from the global recession in 2008 the oil price had 
climbed steadily and reached USD 120 per barrel of Brent oil in 2014, before a collapse in the 
market drove it down to USD 35 in 2016. This had a significant effect on all sectors of the 
industry through the whole value chain from seismic, via exploration to production. It also 
affected engineering designers, yards, and operators (EIA, Annual Review 2014). 
 
As the oil and gas industry has partly recovered, much has changed. As of 2021, oil prices remain 
relatively low compared to previous levels from before 2014. An increasing focus on cost cuts 
and financial discipline has led to reduced margins and profitability.  
 
According to Norwegian association TEKNA, thousands of oil and gas workers were laid off 
between 2013 and 2015. Despite a rise in the activity level only a fraction has returned to the 
industry, and service providers have been forced to operate with reduced staffing. The oil majors 
are making the rest of the supply chain continue to deliver services under strained conditions. 
This has kept the pressure on vendors, which have seen reduced margins and revenue.   
 
The oil and gas industry had surfed on a very prosperous financial wave since the end of the 2008 
crisis. The oil price kept climbing and the need for oil grew steadily. Emerging markets in 
countries which experienced a steady growth in the standard of living, such as China, India, 
Russia, and Brazil brought more and more people out of poverty and they kept asking for oil as 
an alternative to coal. The demand peak year was only pushed further into the future. OPEC 





Operational costs (OPEX) were high, but client demands continuously brought new projects 
forward. Vessel and oil facility owners built ships and rigs like never before with a fleet increase 
on over 30% over the past 10 years. Shipyards had long queues with investors waiting to realize 
their oil industry investments. Bespoke solutions meant a reduced focus on standardization of 
equipment and technical solutions. This in turn meant elevated cost for equipment and surging 
revenues for manufacturers. The high demand for oil to the market kept service suppliers’ rates 
high and all sectors of the industry saw growing activity levels moving from 2008 towards 2014.  
 
In several cases the yards themselves provided finance to progress the construction projects. The 
pressure on the industry to deliver also drained the resource pool. Getting qualified staff became 
a problem. Salaries became inflated as result, which only contributed to the high cost. This was a 
global trend.  
 
Spiralling costs and exhausted resources were a forced, reactive change, and industry 
stakeholders had little or no power to influence the outcome. This was not a wanted change, and 
no one gained or benefitted from the change. The spillover effect influenced other sectors and 
markets which were also forced to deal with this unplanned and unwanted event.  
 
The events taking place during this period have significantly influenced the industry and the 
aftermath is still noticeable, even four years after the manifestation. The need to reduce cost has 
brought reduced activity which in turn has led to cancelled projects, drained competency as 
personnel exit the industry, reduced recruitment, and fewer students in oil related disciplines in 
Universities. With increased focus on financial discipline, we have seen the scrapping and 
recycling of relatively new units, including offshore vessels and mobile drilling units.   
 
The downfall in the O&G market from 2013 to 2020 
As the oil and gas industry has partly recovered from the 2014-2016 oil price decline, much had 
changed. Oil prices remain relatively low compared to previous levels. An increasing focus on 
cost cuts and financial discipline has led to reduced margins and profitability. Thousands of oil 
and gas workers were laid off (TEKNA, 2015).  
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Despite a rise in the activity level only a fraction has returned to the industry, and service 
providers have been forced to operate with reduced staffing. The oil majors are making the rest 
of the supply chain continue to deliver services under strained conditions. This has kept the 
pressure on vendors which have seen reduced margins and revenue.   
 
It is important to debate this new reality to shed light on how the change has been managed and 
understand how the industry is operating in the current conditions. To make the industry grow, 
all levels of the value chain need viable circumstances. There has been an ongoing debate about 
the effect of the slump in prices in the industry and how the aftermath of the 2014-2016 crisis 
still influences the oil and gas sector. The immediate response was a reduction in staff and 
activity, followed by cost saving initiatives such as standardization as well as a search for 
synergies and consolidations. I will elaborate more on this later in the assignment. Now, as the 
industry moves towards a greener future with renewed focus on sustainable operations, new 
technologies lead the way and take up most of the discussion space among stakeholders.  
 
 
Fig. 1 Brent Oil prices 2014 – 2020. Source: US. Energy Information Administration (EIA) 
 
Figure 1 (EIA – crude oil price) describes the slump in oil price from a high level in 2014. The price 
reaches a low in 2016, before starting a slow climb. In 2017 there were cautious optimism in the 




There have been a series of changes in the market and the industry, that have led up to the drop 
in oil process and the continuous lower level of price per barrel to this day.  
 
Mid 2014, the shale oil production started to gain traction with low break-even prices which 
changed the U.S. from a net oil importer to a net oil exporting country (IMF Working Paper No. 
16/131July 6, 2016). At the same time, Canada began to extract a significant level of oil sand 
which also had a great influence on the global oil supply and demand balance. This in turn 
affected the prices.  
 
Simultaneously, China and India saw a reduced need for oil because of stagnation in economic 
development. The same happened in Russia. Saudi Arabia countered this fall in oil prices with 
an increased production output to conquer market share and to compensate for the fall in 
revenue. With the world’s largest reservoirs, Saudi could afford to keep oil prices low, so long 
this was balanced by larger volume. This increased the downward pressure on prices. In sum, 
all this kept oil prices depressed, and the industry locked in a reduced state of activity.  
 
The industry is still experiencing a reduced activity level.  In the North Sea, levels have been kept 
up by field development projects already sanctioned before the crisis hit. However, new projects 
are few and far between and seismic data gathering, and exploration drilling levels continues to 
stay low.  
 
In the rest of the world, activity levels have steadily begun to rise. However, contract rates are 
still very low and the service industry struggles to recover. The constant focus on cost saving and 
low rates combined with only marginal increases in the oil price has improved margins for the oil 
companies. This has still not filtered down through the chain and full industry recovery has still 







This article aims to describe the slump in the oil and gas market from 2013 to 2020 with an in-
depth analysis of the follow-on effects and how these were managed by industry stakeholders. 
I am taking a descriptive approach, using a mixture of methods like observations, informants, 
tracing, and studying of relevant documents.  As a result, the case study cannot be categorized 
as a specific technique. It is rather a way of organizing social data (Blaikie 2000). The descriptive 
case study is well suited to determine factors which influenced decisions and actions 
throughout the crisis. Several famous studies have confirmed the applicability of the case study 
both for explanatory cases (Allison and Zelikow’s Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban 
Missile Crisis, 1999) and descriptive studies (Street Corner Society (1943/1993), by William F. 
Whyte). 
 
With the current disruption in the oil and gas market, caused by both COVID-19 and politically 
motivated actors, it has been natural to reference the ongoing decline in oil prices from 2014 
throughout Q1 in 2021. I will try to briefly explain any common cases and effects on 
stakeholders and markets between 2014-2016 and 2021. Dealing with multiple cases, even 
though it can be argued that they are interlinked, I will be vigilant to ensure replication to 
enable valid comparison between 2014-2016 and 2021 data.  
 
I am building my case on existing market reports and published statistics. I have gathered data 
from a variety of industry sources, including ClarksonPlatou Offshore Outlook, Upstream 
Magazine archive, American Bureau of Shipping Offshore Outlook, and Energy Maritime 
Associates, Floating Production systems Reports. I have collected information from 2013  
up till 2021, and cross-checked output from various sources to confirm data accuracy.  
 
A descriptive case study has narrowed down a phenomenon and endeavours to assess it in 
detail. This is completed against a descriptive theory. The explanatory case study focuses on 
an explanation for a question or a phenomenon (Robert Yin, Case Study Research and 





I have analysed the industry sector by sector looking at new-build volumes, acquisitions, 
mergers, and contracts. I started by separating my data collection in sectors; seismic, 
exploration, production, and support. The sectors will be further explained in detail in the 
next chapter of the article.  
 
I then identified sector fleet sizes, changes in fleet volume from year to year, number of new 
charter contracts, and industry outlook. The yearly outlook gave a picture of the sentiment 
in the industry, which I gauged against facts from next year’s data collection. This provided 
an understanding of how the sector fleets changed from year to year because of the number 
of new deliveries or decommissioning. Mergers and acquisitions have also affected the 
supply-demand ratio in the industry. Hence, I have also gathered and analysed data to 
identify effects on sector fleets and service deliverables from mergers and/or acquisitions. 
  
I have then discussed these findings across all sectors to establish an overarching picture of 
industry events overall and the way these events have been managed by stakeholders and 
decision makers in the industry.  
This provides an understanding of how the downfall has affected both the individual sectors 
but also the industry across the board. Further it provides insight into how the crisis has 
been managed and how actions by decision makers have led to some actors disappearing 
while others have been strengthened by the past 9 years.  
 
Porter`s Five Forces 
By analysing this information through the lens of Michael Porters theory of competitive forces I 
will be able to contribute to research by shedding light on subsequent processes in the oil and 
gas industry occurring because of said market downfall.  After this analysis I will be able to 
comment on the applicability of Porter`s theory as a tool to understand this kind of research 
question, and the mechanisms that tie to the events in the O&G Upstream market as they have 





I have analysed the sectors separately and also looked for ties between the sectors. I have 
found that the sectors in the value chain are interdependent. Particularly the OSV sector is 
affected by events that spill out in any or all the other sectors. All are mostly affected by the 
E&P companies spending strategies.  
 
Porter's five forces are: Competitive rivalry, Potential of new entrants into the industry, Power 
of suppliers, Power of customers, and Threat of substitute product (The Five Competitive 
Forces That Shape Strategy, Michael Porter, 2008) 
 
 
Competitive rivalry (1) 
Competitive rivalry is a significant force. Understanding the competition and being able to 
counter competitive initiatives is key to be able to differentiate own products in a 
demanding market. This includes being aware of competing products, technology 
developments and strategic moves by the competition.  Being aware of going rates in your 
market is also important so you can develop your own pricing strategy which meets the 
customers expectation.  
 
In the O&G upstream industry this means pushing forward technology development 
together with the client. Offering digital and remote services to reduce invasive activities 
which disturb operation, thus supporting uptime and protecting OPEX. It is also important to 
demonstrate technical know-how by subject matter experts and to capitalise on existing 
market share to win over customers from competition through both advertising and real-
time support.  
 
Potential of new entrants into the industry (2) 
New entrants introduce a shift in the existing market balance. This affect pricing strategies, 
cost estimates and the rate of growth needed to maintain an existing market share. Barrier 
to enter or exit a market influences the threat of entries. If the barrier to enter is low, you 
can expect a continuous stream of new competitors. If the barriers are high, the competition 




The most attractive market is that with high barriers to enter and low barriers to exit. 
However, as seen in the O&G upstream sectors, if the barrier to enter is high, investments 
are typically so high that it always makes leaving more painful. Other factors which influence 
barriers to enter - beside financial demands, are the ability to go large to spread cost across 
a bigger volume and customer willingness created by angular momentum stimulated 
networks (group thinking/behaviour).  
 
Power of suppliers (3) 
The power of suppliers refers to the possibility to influence buyers and market terms and 
conditions based on the suppliers’ unique position. This can influence price, quantity, and 
quality. As seen in the O&G industry since 2013, a significant oversupply of service providers,  
a steep fall in commodity prices, combined with deep cuts in E&P spending have left 
upstream stakeholders with very little bargaining power.  
 
Power of customers (4) 
The power of customers (buyers) follows the same mechanisms as described above. 
Customer’s power is high when they have many options and low when there are fewer 
alternatives. This leverage over suppliers provides an opportunity to dictate terms and 
conditions for services rendered.  
 
Threat of substitute product (5) 
A substitution is another way of solving the same existing need. If the cost of changing if low, 
and the perceived differentiation is seen to adds value - this will be appealing to customers 
and the threat of substation is high. If the solution is less than ready, not directly available or 
if the cost of shifting solution is high, then the threat of substitution if low. These effects 
have been seen in the upstream value chain, exemplified by MOUs performing rig moves 






Fig. 2 - Michael Porter`s Five Forces Model 
 
Figure 2 illustrates Michael Porter`s Five Competitive Forces. They are Competitive rivalry, 




The Upstream Value Chain 
The term “upstream” as it is used in the oil and gas industry refers to identification, exploration, 
and production of material. The upstream oil sector is also known as the exploration and 
production (E&P) sector, but I will also focus on the identification part in this article by including 
the seismic sector in my analysis. Additionally, I have included the support sector, as this is a 
service that is provided throughout the entire upstream value chain (specialised offshore 
vessels).  
 
“Downstream” are closer to the customer in the value chain and deals with transportation, 
refining and distribution of the final product to the end user. This article will only address the 







Fig. 3 – The Upstream value chain 
 
Figure 3 pictures how the upstream process starts with the search for profitable areas, rich 
in hydrocarbons, through seismic search and geophysical evaluations. This is done offshore 
using highly specialised seismic vessels. These ships are solely used for seismic surveys to 
identify the best areas on the seabed to drill for oil and gas. Minimising the environmental 
impact is also a core part of the scope during this phase. A seismic detector on board the 
vessel shoots seismic waves to an underwater point. The measured time for the waves to 
refract back to the vessel determine the subsea composition and the extent of the subsea 
reservoir.  
 
The second circle in figure 3 pictures a drilling rig, or a Mobile Offshore Unit (MOU). 
Offshore exploration is mostly performed with mobile offshore units. On mature fields in 
operation, the existing infrastructure may include drilling facilities. MOUs include drillships, 
semi-submersible units and self-elevating units (jack-ups). They drill through the seabed 
down to the reservoir and construct a well with pipelines to the surface (risers) which will 




The third circle in figure 3 shows a Floating Production and Storage Unit (FPSO). Production 
facility design varies based on the location and the sea depth. In shallow water and mature 
areas, it is most common to erect fixed installations. At greater depths, or areas of the world 
with limited infrastructure, the operators usually go for a floating production and storage 
unit (FPSO). The FPSO may have different designs, but a ship shaped design is most used. 
The production facility receives the hydrocarbons from a nearby platform or a subsea well, 
processes it and stores it before it is offloaded onto a tanker, or in some cases through a 
pipeline to shore.  
 
The support sector provides logistical and operational support to other stakeholders across 
the value chain. This is shown in figure 3 by illustrating how the Offshore Support Vessel 
(OSV) ties in by service deliveries to all phases in the upstream value chain. These services 
are typically delivered from offshore support and supply vessels, firefighting units, well 
intervention vessels or stand-by vessels.  These are specialised ship-shaped vessels circling 
the offshore facility, on transport routes between offshore locations and the beach, or ships 
arriving at the offshore location to perform a designated specialised activity.  
 
 
Analysis of the sectors in the upstream value chain (empiric data and analysis) 
The seismic sector 
In 2013, the seismic sector counted 234 vessels (ClarksonPlatou, Offshore Outlook, Aug 2013). 
This was the result of a steady growth over the past 10 years of almost 30% across the sector 
fleet. Vessels are divided between 2D and 3D capabilities, where 2D vessels use a single seismic 
streamer towed behind the vessel. 2D vessels are typically used for frontier exploration to 
identify areas of interest. 3D vessels use multiple seismic streamers which produce a more 
detailed result. Survey work was performed in Brazil, the Eastern Mediterranean and Nova 
Scotia, and an average of nine new vessels per year were expected into the existing seismic 




In 2014, oil companies started to reduce their budgets as a result of the downfall in the oil prices 
and subsequent cash flow issues. Being at the very front of the upstream value chain, this 
reduction directly impacted the seismic sector immediately.  
 
Oil companies involved in exploration & production (E&P) were able to pick the most advanced 
vessels for their seismic projects. This in turn lead to vessel owners downgrading mid-range 3D 
vessels into 2D vessels to protect the remaining 3D pool and to preserve higher rates for the 
remaining 3D vessels (ClarksonPlatou, Offshore Outlook, Aug 2015).  
 
Moving into 2015, the sector saw a large vessel oversupply, which influenced orderbook figures 
and vessel scrapings (ABS Fleet & Orderbook Activity, 2015). Owners stopped ordering new units, 
they scrapped older vessels and by the end of the year, 15% of the active fleet was laid-up. 2016 
continued along the same track with few new contracts and overall fleet consolidations, 
including selling and scrapping of older units. During 2016, the seismic companies started to 
explore new business strategies. Up until now, the most common way to operate had been 
under contract with a single client. Now, the seismic companies started doing surveys on their 
own to build up a multi-client database containing information which could be sold to multiple 
clients (ClarksonPlatou, Offshore Outlook, 2015).  
 
The development of 4D capabilities had also grown over time, a technique with repeated 3D 
shoots over a set location to develop time lapsed 3D data. This information was used to visualize 
reservoir development over time (the fourth dimension). New acquisition techniques included 
permanent deployment on the seabed, and a source vessel that could capture data without 
towed streamers. 
 
In 2018 market conditions started to ease. E&P companies were more active, and the licensing 
activity had picked up (EIA, Year in Review, 2018). As of start of August 2018, the seismic fleet 
counted 218 vessels. One third of these vessels were laid up.  The global seismic fleet was 
relatively unconsolidated with an average of 2.4 vessels per owner. The E&P companies did not 
prefer high specification vessels, which constrained owners with a modern fleet’s ability to 
diversify and promote higher rates. ExxonMobil`s Liza project in Guyana was one of few 
contributors to the seismic backlog (Upstream Online, 13. December 2018).   
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The weak market situation continued through 2019, 2020 and into 2021. When other sectors got 
hit by the impact of Covid-19, the seismic sector was already on its knees with 65% of the total of 
200 vessels in lay-up as of February 2021.  
 
The size of the market had shrunk considerably since its peak in 2013, and there has been a 
general shift away from contract seismic work towards most of the business being multiclient 
seismic with the seismic company performing their own surveys and markets the results to 
multiple clients. As a result, many stakeholders left the sector.  
 
           
Figures 4 & 5 - Seismic 3D vessel utilasation and top owners. Source: ClarksonPlatou research,  
Offshore Outlook. 
 
Figures 4 and 5 describes the seismic sector. Figure 3 shows how the utilisation rate for 3D 
vessels dropped significantly from 2013 all the way till 2021. Only about 30 % of the total fleet 
was working in 2021. Figure 4 list the 18 largest seismic companies in the world. The largest 
company by far, is the Norwegian company Shearwater GeoServices, based in Bergen.  
 
Analysing the seismic sector from 2013 to 2021 considering Michael Porter’s theory of five forces 




The seismic sector was peaking in 2013 and the threat of new entries was definitively present. 
With available financing and beneficial down payment terms from the shipyards, barriers to 
entry were few.  New orderbook figures were high as fleet owners scaled up.  E&P companies 
depend on reliable reservoir information and with no substitute product or alternative process in 
the market, the seismic sector was the only channel for data distribution.  
 
With decline in the oil price came cancellations of projects and E&P investments. This hit the 
seismic sector first, and as a result the customer got the upper hand in contract negotiations.  
Rather than a force, technology innovation was a factor leading to development of new services 
and the sector saw multiclient seismic as an alternative to single client contracts. Another 
technology factor which had developed over time was 4D data, with the time element as the 
fourth factor to enhance reservoir assessments.  
 
Competitive rivalry sharpened further following the new market reality after 2013. Several 3D 
vessels were downgraded to 2D vessels. However, with an unconsolidated global fleet and 
clients with no preference for high tech. vessels, owners had few opportunities to differentiate 
themselves to promote higher rates.   
 
 
The Exploration and Drilling sector 
The mobile-offshore-unit (MOU) sector is mainly made up of self-elevating (jack-up) and column 
stabilised semi-submersible (semis) units. Consequently, this analysis will only look at data from 
jack-ups and semis. In 2013, the MOU fleet had seen a fantastic growth over the past 10 years 
with a more than 30 % increase since the beginning of 2004 (ClarksonPlatou, Offshore Outlook, 
2013).  
 
The largest growth came in the deepwater segment A very large portion of the fleet was 30 years 
or older, so the ongoing replacement cycle was very needed. Most of the new projects surfaced 
in Brazil, West Africa, and the Gulf of Mexico (Upstream Online, 20th June, 2014). Norway and the 
Russian arctic sectors also represented a great deal of promise at this time.  
As the oil price started to fall, the oversupply became a real problem. Day-rates fell, something 
that affected the jack-up segment first (ABS Fleet & Orderbook Activity, 2014).  
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Newbuild orders slowed down. The low down-payments on these units meant that many 
speculators walked away from projects before the units were delivered from the yard.  
 
Other new builds were delayed at the yard. Moving into 2015, oversupply continued to be the 
biggest issue and owners were reluctant to take delivery of new units from yards.  
 
              
Figures 6 & 7 Jack-up activity levels. Source: ClarksonPlatou research,  Offshore Outlook. 
 
Figures 6 & 7 details the activity level in the jack-up sector. Figure 5 shows how reactivation took 
the rigs out of lay-up from 2008 till 2011 (curve dropping) before a climb in stacking indicates a 
drop in activity, peaking in 2014. When a rig is cold stacked it means that it is preserved, shut 
down and abandoned, and not marketed for drilling campaigns. From 2014 we see a drop in cold 
stack, which again reflects the cautious optimism in the industry.  
 
However, Covid-19 put a stop to the activity, and we can see that more and more units were cold 
stacked, reaching almost 90% of the global fleet by January 2021. Figure 7 shows how activity in 
the Middle East and Asia is driving the jack-up sector. A large portion of the existing fleet got 
stacked or scrapped. Given the limited value of scrapping, many owners decided to stack the 
units as an alternative.  
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Many companies had also used the MOUs as collateral for loans and were hence unable to scrap 
them without disturbing the balance with their financial partners. Deep-water and Ultra-Deep-
water units were working below their capabilities, pushing lower specification units out of the 
market.  
 
More projects were being cancelled and rig owners continued to remove old tonnage from the 
market. In 2017, the first signs of a recovered MOU market started to emerge, with projects in 
the Middle East, and Gulf of Mexico. There was still a massive oversupply and rates were low. 
Total fleet utilization remained at around 60%. With increased activity in Brazil, the deepwater 
segment was seen as the future.  
 
With a new desire for lower carbon energy, gas fields off the coast of Mozambique also attracted 
a lot of interest (Upstream Online, 29th November 2018). Through 2018 and into 2019, a steady 
rise in demand gave hope to the MOU sector. Fleet consolidation and scrapping of older low-
tech units helped to balance to supply-demand ratio.  
 
Following the Covid-19 outbreak, the demand for MOUs fell dramatically in 2020 and remains 
low to this date. Utilization fell back to 63% of August 2020 and the entire sector has 
deteriorated notably (ClarksonPlatou, Offshore Outlook, Aug. 2020). One third of the entire 
industry recovery taking place between 2018 and 2018 vaporized. Several of the largest drilling 
contractors have sought bankruptcy protection and entered Chapter 11 negotiations.  It is 
expected that new build deliveries will be non-existent in the foreseeable future and the 
continuous scrapping activity high.  
 
Considering Porter`s framework and its applicability in the MOU segment from 2013 until 2021, 
there are several notable relevancies. Barriers to entry were virtually non-existent in 2013. As a 
result, several investors and small companies entered the drilling contractor market.  
 
Yards welcomed the new stakeholders and sometimes offered a 90-10 down payment scheme to 
stimulate new contracts, where the drilling contractor only had to pay 10% of the total cost up 
front and the rest on delivery.  
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The ease of substitution has not been a threat to market stakeholders as MOUs have maintained 
their place in the value chain as the only suitable alternative for offshore drilling. Drillships have 
never been established as a competitive alternative in shallow- or mid-level water depths.   
 
Since 2013 the bargaining power of the drilling contractors has been limited due to the massive 
oversupply in the market. It has been the customers’ prerogative to pick and choose. This has led 
to lower day rates (close to OPEX), and sometimes a shift of cost centre for variable expenses, 
i.e., fuel, on board facility services etc, from the client to the drilling contractor.   
 
Competitive rivalry has been fierce over time since 2013 with lowered day rates leading into a 
unsustainable downwards spiral. With increasing numbers of units going into lay-up or 
decommissioning, companies have had to let go a large number of employees. Several drilling 
contractors have entered Chapter 11 debt negotiations, some companies have even done this 
more than once since 2013. Others have consolidated fleet and operations by merging with 
competitors. Transocean`s take-over of Ocean Rig and Songa Offshore is one example. The 
merger between Rowan and Ensco into the new company Valaris, is another.   
 
This consolidation has also opened the door to new entries; Borr Drilling was established in 2016 
and quickly acquired most of Transocean`s jack-ups along with some still undelivered new builds 
at Keppel in Singapore.  
 
Other factors which have influenced the market since 2013 are the development of improved 
BOP subsea pressure control systems, along with other managed pressure drilling equipment 
types and processes. This has been a way for drilling contractors to differentiate themselves and 
access niche jobs. We have also seen drilling rigs being utilised as offshore accommodation units 









The Floating Production sector 
The Floating Production Storage and Offloading (FPSO) fleet was at its largest in 2013, counting 
187 units (EMA, Floating Production Systems Quarterly Reports, 2013). A steady growth of new 
vessels continued to complement the fleet and an average of 20 FPSO orders each year were 
expected at the time. The sector remained relatively strong until mid-2015 when the entire 
upstream market was hit hard by the fall in commodity prices.  
 
The ongoing investigation into Operation Car Wash in Brazil also added a heightened risk to the 
FPSO outlook. Operation Car Wash was a huge corruption scandal in Brazil, involving Petrobras 
executives (Upstream Online, 4th December 2015). However, the Asian demand for oil gave hope 
to further expansion of the FPSO segment.  
 
Moving into 2016, the sector experienced cuts in E&P spending because of reduced revenue, 
leading to delayed, suspended, and cancelled projects. By August of 2016, only 173 of the FPSO 
fleet`s 195 units where actively producing (ClarksonPlatou, Offshore Outlook, 2016).  
 
Cost cutting (scaling back) in several projects and a period of stable higher oil prices aided the 
FPSO sector through 2017 and 2018 with 13 new orders in total, along with increased activity. 
The fleet now counted 211 units, of which 190 were working. Projects on hold since 2014 were 
sanctioned, supporting signs of improvement as a result of a more sustainable oil price. The 




Fig. 8, Floating Production Awards in Relation to Oil Price. Source: EMA, 2021 quarterly report (Apr.) 
 
Figure 8 include data references from both EMA and EIA. Energy Maritime Associates (EMA) 
provides market research to the offshore energy sector and releases a quarterly Floating 
Production Systems Report. EIA is the U.S Energy Information Administration. Prices are shown 
in US dollars per barrel of West Texas Intermediate (WTI) which is a US preference for a certain 
measure and pricing model against a Texan type of oil quality. The oil quality differs a bit from 
North Sea Brent, which is the standard oil type for global price statistic. WTI is also slightly lower 
in price. The other axis details number of production units which have been contracted for work. 
Despite a visible decline in activity between 2014 and 2017, the production sector is the O&G 
upstream sector with the most stable activity levels during the time period of this analysis.  
 
Even as the impact of Covid-19 took effect in 2020, Petrobras continued to progress some large 
FPSO developments. Smaller operators struggled more, and, on the whole, contracts were few 
and far between. As the oil price crashed again in March of 2020, investment decisions and 





Lockdown restrictions and supply chain disruption also hampered projects, and only five FPSO 
projects with investment decisions made early in 2020 progressed.  However, 10 new FPSO 
projects are expected to materialize during 2021, mainly in Brazil. Other regions will likely still 
have to wait for a more enduring improvement in oil prices (EMA, Floating Production Systems 
Quarterly Reports, 2021).  
 
The threat of substitutes, as described by Michael Porter, is applicable in the FPSO sector with 
sub sea tie-back and pipelines to shore as viable alternatives to the FPSO. The concept design 
solution depends on several factors like water depth, existing infrastructure, distance to shore, 
and more. The FPSO alternative typically lends itself well to projects in South America, West 
Africa, and Asia, and is the prevailing options for most E&P companies in these regions.   
 
Entering the FPSO sector is financially demanding, as the cost of project execution is very high.  
As a result, the current stakeholders have existed in the segment over time. Despite continuous 
competition, the number of major FPSO owners remain relatively stable. A new development has 
been EPC companies and yards taking a larger role in projects. We have also seen collaborations 
between FPSO companies where a divided scope has involved different stakeholders in 
preparations of hull and topside.  
 
The bargaining power sits exclusively with the client, and FPSO owners compete over contracts 
with terms dictated by the oil companies. This leads to extensive competitive rivalry between 
FPSO owners to differentiate themselves with robust engineering solutions, environmentally 
sound concepts, and a sustainable emissions profile. However, cost is the main driver for any 
FPSO project and the tenderer with the lowest bid usually wins the contract.  
 
Other factors which have had influence on the sector include technological innovation, mainly on 
the environmental side. We see a growing focus on sustainability, both from oil majors but also 
from banks and other financing partners. FPSO companies and their vessels need a green profile 
to secure finances for projects, as well as to be selected by the client. Remote digital solutions 
have also introduced improved safety, more efficient operations, and a significant cost saving for 




The Offshore Support Vessel sector 
I have defined the support sector as offshore support vessels in this article; anchor handlers tug 
supply (AHT/AHTS) and platform supply vessels (PSV).  This fleet had almost doubled between 
2003 and 2013 and continued to grow. As a result of the fall in oil prices, the market was fragile, 
and demand shifted towards larger vessels with multipurpose capabilities. Clients sought more 
deck space and higher supply capacity.  
 
The greatest demand for anchor handlers come from MOUs, and with reduced drilling activity 
from 2014 onwards came a reduced need for AHT/AHTS vessels. Also, the newer generations of 
MOU had the ability to relocate and operate without assistance of support vessels 
(ClarksonPlatou, Offshore Outlook, 2014). With a huge market oversupply, new orders dried out. 
This continued into 2015 with a further reduction in ultra-deep projects, which affected both 
AHTS and PSVs (ABS Fleet & Orderbook Activity, 2015). This led to an increasing number of laid 
up vessels. 2016 charter rates were the lowest over the last decade.  
 
The situation has remained more or less the same until today. The current support vessel fleet is 
much larger than demand dictates and as a result the utilisation rate remains just above 50%. 
With relatively affordable prices and welcoming yards, barriers to entry for new stakeholders 
were traditionally few. As a result, the offshore support vessel sector is diverse in ownership. 
                      
Figures 9 & 10 - AHTS top owners and vessel utalisation. Source: ClarksonPlatou research,  
Offshore Outlook.  
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Figures 9 shows a steady decline in Anchor Handling Tug Supply (AHTS) activity from 2013 and 
into 2021. The increase in oil price and exploration and production (E&P) activity in 2018 and 
2019 helped the sector some. However, the impact of Covid-19 drove the utilisation rate down 
to approx. 60% by February of 2021. Figure 10 details the largest vessel owners. The global 
offshore support vessel fleet consists of a lot of small companies, which is reflected by the fact 
that the top three AHTS owners only represent 13% of the total number of vessels.  
 
The average 2021 fleet size is only four units, indicating the vast number of OSV companies and 
owners across the global market. This constellation also affects the lack of willingness to scrap 
vessels to counter oversupply.  
 
Scrapping vessels from a small fleet makes a relatively deep cut on the total. Also, the 
investments from owners into these smaller companies creates a personal bond to the assets 
that differs from larger, more distanced companies.  
 
Some of the larger stakeholders used the downfall to merge with competitors to consolidate 
fleets and operation. Tidewater and GulfMark completed a merger in 2018, making them the 
largest OSV company in the world. Also, Norwegian companies Rem Offshore, Farstad Shipping 
ASA and Deep-Sea Supply Plc. merged with Solstad Offshore during the same period.  
 
The oversupply puts the bargaining power with the client. As a result, the charter day rate has 
continued shrinking from 2013 until today. The threat of substitutes is real, with newer MOUs 
capable of managing rig moves and ongoing operations without the support of OSVs.  
 
Also, with significantly reduced E&P activity, PSV demand has shrunk considerably. A young, 
large fleet with a lot of available assets, leaves the PSV owner very limited bargaining power. 
Consequently, clients have contracted vessels which operate below their capabilities, further 





Figure 11, Upstream sectors timeline. 
 
The upstream sectors timeline in Figure 11 shows an extract of my data and analysis. In 2014, 
which is the time for when my analysis begins, the industry had seen six good years during a 
stable recovery period since the financial crisis in 2008.  
 
A combination of oversupply, lack of global demand, geopolitical events and a growing 
exploration and production of shale oil, took the oil price into a slump in 2014 which lasted 
several years. As a result, activity levels dropped, and vessels and mobile units lost contracts. 
Units under construction where delayed or delivery were postponed. Some signs of recovery at 
the end of 2017 / beginning of 2018 brough some relief and heightened oil prices.  
 
The activity grew slowly but steadily until Covid-19 hit the oil and gas market with full force in 
March 2020, wiping out the result of the small recovery and bringing oil prices down below USD 
40 per barrel of Brent oil.  
 
Summary and Discussion 
The seismic sector is at the very beginning of the upstream value chain and this sector was 
hit first by cuts in E&P spending. With expensive vessels, barriers are high both to enter and 
exit the market. Some technology development has improved service deliveries, like 4D data 
and permanently placed acoustic transponders on the seabed. Strategic decisions to let 
vessels operate below capabilities (older 3D vessels doing 2D work) in attempts to 
differentiate fleets and companies have not been successful.  
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A decline in contract work has led to multi-client work where the seismic company do 
surveys on their own expense and market data to more than one client.  
 
The exploration segment experienced very favorable new build terms between 2008 and 
2014 which led to a lot of new contracts since barriers to entry was relatively low. The fleet 
was old at the time and the recycle process was much needed.  
 
With the sudden drop in oil prices and a halt in exploration work, the mobile offshore unit 
sector was quickly oversupplied. Competitive rivalry was intense. Units were laid up and 
several owners delayed or even walked away from undelivered drilling rigs. As time 
progressed most drilling contractors used this idle period to reconsolidate their fleets. 
Scraping of units, company mergers and debt negotiations were common occurrences in the 
exploration sector.  
 
The segment saw little new entries but neither many exits. This can be explained by Porter`s 
theory about barriers as new rigs at the time cost between 300-500 mill. US dollar, and was 
quite a commitment, even for mature companies.  
 
Production vessels ranged between new builds and converted oil tankers. Both options are 
very costly and require a firm long-term contract to be executed. Following the seismic and 
exploration segments, production was also hit in 2014. Competitive rivalry led to cost cuts 
and lower fees. Several projects went ahead because of investment decisions already made. 
The production sector was the upstream sector least hit by the downfall between 2013 and 
2021.  
 
We have seen the threat of substitution play out as FPSOs are increasingly competing 
against tie-back and pipeline design solutions as infrastructure continue to improve in 
mature fields. Currently we see a focus on sustainability and green profiling as ways to 
differentiate themselves among cost conscious clients and competitors. However, the 




The support sector includes a myriad of companies, with the average owner holding less 
than 4 vessels in her fleet. The top three companies only own 13% of the total fleet. Barriers 
to entry has traditionally been low, and as a result the sector is widely oversupplied. The 
vessel owner is left with little bargaining power and suppressed rates and massive lay-up is 
the result of buyer dominance, particularly since the impact of Covid-19 wiped out the 
positive effects of a brief and much-needed market recovery in 2018/2019.   
 
Given the small average fleet, scrapping has relatively large impact on fleets and owners 
have been reluctant to decommission necessary parts of the global fleet. Hence, vessels 
have operated below capabilities on rates very close to OPEX.  
 
The analysis of the sectors in light of Porter`s theory has demonstrated its applicability for 
the complex, interdependent upstream value chain. The five forces describe activities and 
events which has played out across the sectors in the upstream industry with great accuracy.  
This is backed up by market intelligence and historic statistics from the oil and gas industry. 
My two objectives at the start of the article were to describe the changes in the Upstream 
sector of the global oil industry between 2014 and 2021.  
 
The article has provided this description and empiric data has been analysed, using Porter’s 
Five Competitive Forces.  The analysis has confirmed the theory`s applicability for the O&G 
upstream sector and as a result, both my objectives for this study have been met. This 
confirmation and validated knowledge can help support strategies and decision making for 




Analysing the sectors in the O&G Upstream value chain has highlighted their interdependencies 
and the common effects across sectors from a market influenced by fluctuations in commodity 
prices.  Some sectors have enjoyed relatively low barriers to entry as a result of a willingness in 
the finance sector to support the O&G industry.  
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This has fueled an oversupply, both in the MOU and OSV markets. Only the MOU owners have 
taken sufficient necessary steps to remove units from the global fleet in an effort to balance the 
demand-supply ratio. Barriers to leaving the sector have mostly been high, given the significant 
investment needed to get in. However, in some cases we have seen speculative investors 
walking away from units prior to delivery because of very low down-payment arrangements up 
front.  
 
With OSV owners we have seen a reluctance to scrap or reconsolidate because of the relatively 
large impact this would have on smaller fleets. The production sector has seen the most stable 
period with high barriers to entry, which has supported a stable market with mostly known 
stakeholders.  
 
We have seen some form of substitutes, either as a force or a factor, across all sectors. Seismic 
companies have moved from single client contacts to multi-client work, new generations of 
MOUs can perform rig moves without support of AHTSs, and FPSOs are competing against tie-
back and pipeline design solutions as infrastructure continue to improve in mature fields.  
 
Since 2013, the bargaining power has mostly sat with the customer, given the drop in oil prices, 
a general oversupply in the market, and the impact of Covid-19 following shortly after a brief 
market recovery in 2018/2019.   
 
Competitive rivalry is quite possibly the strongest force in the O&G Upstream markets. Sector 
stakeholders try to differentiate themselves by technology development and innovation, fleet 
consolidation, and focus on a green company profile with sustainable operations. However, the 
ultimate driver in successful contract negotiations is still cost.  
 
I have not analysed the downstream sector, oil majors activity, or the O&G industry overall. 
However, I notice that other scientists have successfully applied Porter`s Five Competitive 
forces to analyse said sector in the past. Based on published analysis and reports it can be 
assumed that Porter`s theory also is applicable in other O&G sectors as well as to analyse the 




My analysis of the sectors in the O&G Upstream value chain has demonstrated the applicability 
of Porter`s Five Force model for this segment. The five forces have played out as described by 
Porter, and the events that have taken place across the Upstream value chain can easily be 




Applied Figures in the article 
Figure # Content 
1 Brent Oil prices 2014 – 2020 
2 Michael Porter`s Five Forces Model 
3 The Upstream value chain 
4 Seismic 3D vessel utilasation  
5 Seismic 3D vessel top owners 
6 Jack-up activity levels, cold stacking 
7 Jack-up activity levels, deployment 
8 Floating Production Awards in Relation to Oil Price 
9 AHTS vessel utalisation 
10 AHTS top owners 








1. Kurt Lewin and the Planned Approach to Change; by Bernard Burnes in Journal of 
Management Studies 41:6 September 2004 
2. Accelerate; a Harvard Business Review article by John P. Knotter, November 2012  
3. Designing Social Research by Norman Blaikie, 2000 
4. Case study research: Design and methods by Robert Yin, 1989 and 2018 (3rd and 6th 
Editions) 
5. Increasing the believability of case study reports. The Alberta Journal of Educational 
Research, 48, 20–29 by Bachor, D. G., 2002. 
6. Applied research design. Newbury Park, CA: Sage by Hedrick, T., Bickman, L., & Rog, D. J., 
1993. 
7. Rethinking case study, notes from the second Cambridge conference: Adelman, Jenkins 
and Kemmis, 1977.  
8. ClarksonPlatou Offshore Research, Review and Outlook from 2013 to 2021 
9.  Situasjonen i norsk olje- og gassvirksomhet II, Tekna-rapport 5/2015 
10.  www.eia.gov  
a. Year in Review: Crude Oil Prices 2014 
b. Weekly Analysis, May 2016 
11. https://www.upstreamonline.com/  
12. Energy Maritime Associates (EMA) Floating Production Systems Quarterly Reports 2013-
2021 
13. American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) Fleet & Orderbook Activity, 2013 – 2021 
14. Management Research News, Volume 23 Number 7/8 2000, Competitive Advantage in 
Global Industries by D. Passemard and Brian H. Kleiner 
15. Journal of East-West Business, Economic Sanctions Disruption on International Trade 
Patterns and Global Trade Dynamics: Analyzing the Effects of the European Union’s 
Sanctions on Russia, June Borge Doornich & Andreas Raspotnik12 Oct 2020. 
16. Elsevier, Energy technology dependence - A value chain analysis of geothermal power in 
the EU, Bram Vons_ee, Wina Crijns-Graus, Wen Liu, Copernicus Institute of Sustainable 
Development, Utrecht University, 2019 
48 
 
17. The Five Competitive Forces That Shape Strategy, Michael Porter, Harvard Business Review 
January 2008 
18. TEKNA Rapport 2/2015: Situasjonen i olje- og gassvirksomhet 
19. An analysis of OPEC’s strategic actions, US shale growth and the 2014 oil price crash, 
Alberto Behar, and Robert A Ritz, International Monetary Fund (IMF) Working Paper 
16/131, 2016 
 
 
